The practical failure of the qualified electronic signature across Europe is a good lesson on the factors that are critical for information security in public administration and business: the need for well defined objectives, the differentiation of security services, interoperability and a design approach based on risk management. The qualified electronic signature (QES) 1 and the global electronic services market have existed for some time now, but each seems to exist in parallel realities.
People buy goods and services over the internet all the time with other forms of electronic signature (such as the 'I accept' icon, by ticking a box, or typing a name into an e-mail 2 ), but the market for QES only seems to serve itself, and there is little connection between sales of goods and services over the internet and the use of a QES. E-government is widely available in some countries, but not in those that took the QES approach. In this article, the author offers an opinion as to how this happened, based on a decade of experience in consulting on information security with a special focus on authentication and the digital signature (the digital signature is also called an 'advanced electronic signature' in the EU Directive), commenting and observing legislation and what actually happens in this field.
Interoperability issues with the qualified electronic signature
Directive 1999/93/EC is a good legal framework for the QES, but its high-level and abstract nature was one factor that largely attributed to its failure. This Directive resulted in a number of different laws by Member States that are incompatible at a technical and semantic level.
The first challenge was the selection of signature and document formats for qualified electronic signatures. At the time the directive was enacted, there were two wellestablished and standard signature formats available: PKCS#7 and CMS -now called CAdES (ETSI 101 733) and initial drafts of XAdES (ETSI 101 903) . 3 When newly established certification authorities and software houses (often the same entity), encouraged by the new legislation, started to design their certification services, they had to make decisions on appropriate formats. But the problem was that in 2002 this sector seemed to have no idea what anyone would be going to use the QES for, except for a very general (and very optimistic) buzz of having a lot of e-everything in front of every word (e-government, e-business, e-banking, etc).
Technical products developed at that time -with no specific business problem that needed to be solvedand submitted greatly to the pan-European format mess that we are now enjoying. Having no specific objective, companies designed the most general solutions they could think of ('sign something'), and QES became an example of the common wisdom that something OJ L 013, 19/01/2000 P. 0012 -0020. 2 For case law across the globe on these and other forms of electronic signature, see Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (2nd edn, Tottel, 2007) . 3 For an exhaustive list of standards relating to digital signatures, see appendix 3 in Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (2nd edn, Tottel, 2007). designed to do everything is not good at doing anything. For example, four Polish certification authorities that existed at that time all produced a generic 'sign-a-byte-stream ' program 4 that allowed the user to create a detached signature (figure 1) or embed the file inside a signed container (figure 2). Surprisingly, each of the companies chose a different signature format, 5 and this simple decision has prevented any possible intra-country interoperability for years. If the reader wonders how this happened with four companies and just three formats allowed by law, here is the solution: one of them used XAdES, one used CAdES and two used PKCS#7 for a signature, but in a different file container. This is how the situation looked like in 2005. As hard to believe as it is, in 2008 there were already fourteen formats available on the Polish market, and each of the four initial formats evolved by changing minor details, plus a few new ones were added by small companies fortunate enough to win bids from the public administration. Out of the fourteen formats, only one pair was interoperable. For example, three products on the market used XAdES format to output signed files, but all used different file extensions (.sig, .xml, .xades), 6 although it might be correct to say that it was likely that each could open the other's files. To add even more confusion, the .sig extension seemed very popular -at the same time four products used it do name their output files, but they used different formats inside.
7 As a result of these two trends, virtually every application was enclosed in its own format and extension, even if some of them could have been interoperable.
From the functional point of view, it is not important to select the best format, because where a single format is agreed between all the parties, it will then be numerous enough to create a critical mass in a given sector.
8 Most specific business functions that might be required can be achieved using any of the available formats, even if it is considered 'old', such as PKCS#7, and does not have any 'modern' features. Looking back over the previous years, it seems as if there were endless technical academic discussions on minor and relatively unimportant aspects of the QES that caused different companies to choose different formats to do the same thing. As a result, useful facilities such as the ability to use minor security-enhancing features prevented people from tackling the much bigger issue of interoperability and usefulness. A rare example of such interoperability was where several countries chose the same signature format (PKCS#7) and the same extension (.p7m) as their basic container for digitally signed files. As result, it was, for example, possible to take a file created by an Italian application and open it in a German application -which is the purpose of interoperability. 2008/ kompatybilnosc-formatow-podpisuelektronicznego-w-polsce-bliska-zeru.html. 8 Deciding which format is the best to use depends on establishing the purpose. If this is not agreed, the dispute on the features to be given to a format can easily slip into pointless discussion using irrelevant arguments.
All the generic 'sign-a-byte-stream' applications have yet another problem -they are all autonomous, singlefunction applications, and do not integrate with any other technology, and are barely usable. All a user can do is to run the application, open a file, click through several screens loaded with technical and legal information, and either click to 'sign' or 'verify' a file created in another application. This is how most applications of qualified electronic signatures sold by certification authorities for users in Europe work.
If the current model of QES is considered in relation to ergonomics and ease of use, it can be equated to early Windows as we remember it from the 1990s. Technical excellence (at least theoretical technical excellence 9 ), compliance with the requirements of CWA 14355 10 and the general lack of any idea what the applications should be actually be signing, made them difficult to understand for anyone without a strong technical background (and having a legal background did not necessarily mean that a lawyer or judge understood the complexities of the QES).
11 This is a perfect example on how ignoring the human factor in the design of the system rendered a perfectly secure architecture (at least theoretically 12 ) unusable. Potential users declined to consider using the QES, and used WinZip if they wanted a generic file archive, and possibly SecureZIP, if they wanted enhanced security features. In addition, if a user wanted to produce an electronic document with an embedded signature, then they would rather consider the digital signature features in MS Office, Open Office or Adobe Acrobat, although these are not suitable for a QES, for the reasons explained below. (2004, 2005) . For an exposition on this point in legal terms, see Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (2nd edn, Tottel, 2007) ). Another helpful move in right direction is PDF Advanced Electronic Signatures (PAdES) (ETSI TS 102 778). PAdES is interesting because it is a format that tries to solve a specific problem: secure delivery and long-term storage of electronic documents, 18 and it can also help with providing for technical interoperability.
19 Introduced ten years after Directive 1999/93/EC, implementing this standard would require the gradual reversal of all local inventions, which may take another decade to complete. At the time of the Directive, the technical nature of the concept of the digital signature was based on the X.509 security framework, and this model may no longer be interesting for anyone except for companies earning income from endless consulting and analysis of the Directive 1999/93/EC model.
20

Hardware limitations
The requirement to use a secure signature creation device (SSCD), or a cryptographic card for a QES also seems to be a significant barrier for most users. This is the main method to satisfy the requirements of article 2(2) of Directive 1999/93/EC for the signature device to remain under the sole control of the signatory: 2. 'advanced electronic signature' means an electronic signature which meets the following requirements:
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory; (b) it is capable of identifying the signatory; (c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; and (d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable;
As pointed out by Mason, this is not a definition, but a number of characteristics relating to performance. 21 This is one of the basic assumptions of the QES security model, although in many cases it is not necessary for a QES to have a SSCD. The problem is, that requiring a QES to have a SSCD without fully understanding the consequences of complex hardware and software dependency is one of the factors that have made digital signatures and qualified electronic signatures exceedingly difficult to use. 22 However, there is a flaw in the characteristics relating to the advanced electronic signature, as pointed out by Brazell and Mason -that is, a digital signature cannot meet the requirements of the first characteristic, that of being 'uniquely linked to the signatory'.
23 This is because it can only be linked to the private key of the signatory, and no person is capable of memorising the private key. This means the private key must be retained on a computer, disk or smart card. This is what is meant by 'means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control'. The problem is, a person cannot control the private key. If the private key is on a smart card, the card can be lost, stolen or 'borrowed'. 24 If the private key is on a computer, a malicious third party can obtain access to it and, once they have obtained the password, us it as they wish. In electronic signature engineering, the 'link to the signatory' is explained as follows: theoretically, only one copy of the private key exists, and it is usually created by the certification authority and issued to the signatory for their use. It is usually stored on a smart card that prevents the creation of more copies, and its use is ' in Stephen Mason, general editor, Electronic Evidence, (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) in which this discussion is considered in detail. 23 Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (2nd edn, Tottel, 2007) 4.7 -4.8; Lorna Brazell, Electronic Signatures Law and Regulation, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) Art. 47. Kto składa bezpieczny podpis elektroniczny za pomocą danych służących do składania podpisu elektronicznego, które zostały przyporządkowane do innej osoby, podlega grzywnie lub karze pozbawienia wolności do lat 3 albo obu tym karom łącznie.
Article 47. Anyone who executes a secure electronic signature using the data for the execution of an electronic signature which were assigned to another person shall be liable to a fine or a penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to three years or both these penalties jointly.
Certification authorities also require the user to protect the card and password in the certification service contract, but in reality, users do not follow this, as described below in the ZUS case study.
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The hardware itself was significant problem in 2002, when most readers were connected over RS-232 (Recommended Standard 232) (this is by the Electronic Industries Association, and is a standard for data and control signals that connect between data terminal equipment and data circuit terminating equipment, and is commonly used in computer serial ports). At the time, even engineers found it really difficult to have all the components of a QES working. For instance, a smart card reader would not work until the user provided the operating system with the serial port parameters and installed an item of special software provided by the vendor -this was a significant usability problem. Most of the configuration is now automated; if the user connects the reader, it should work, although the user must still install the smart card driver software manually. However, cryptographic card drivers (a driver is an additional item of software that provides the interface between the device and the operating system -drivers are supplied by the vendor in most cases) remain a problem. This is because smart card drivers are not installed automatically when the user inserts the smart card into the reader; which means it will not work unless the user installs the driver software provided by the vendor. The intention may not be to compel the customer to use their particular technology, but it enables the personalisation of a large number of smart cards. This problem is exacerbated, because some vendors do not install PKCS#11 drivers that enable any user application to work with each other (PKCS#11 is a standard from RSA Security for cryptographic hardware drivers). Cryptographic API from Microsoft was the first, vendor specific way for applications to communicate to a smart card and, for instance, request the signing of data. Then PKCS#11 was developed, and now both standards seem to coexist. An increasing number of vendors now provide PKCS#11 drivers for their smart cards, but it is not universally true. PKCS#11 is, in general, more interoperable and not bound to an operating system. Matters are more complex for those handling qualified certificates for operating systems other than Windows. In addition to the standard PKCS#11 interface, they have a built-in JavaCard applet that provides additional protection; in reality, this means that it is necessary to have a matching driver from the vendor to use each card, which causes more problems of interoperability.
The extent of the technical difficulties that can prevent ordinary people from using a QES can be illustrated by the requirement to buy and install a $15 smart card reader. This was one of the proposed explanations as to why only 5.4 per cent (30, 275) of 38 million, this means the take-up is less than 0.5 per cent of the population. In Estonia, the coverage is over 77 per cent.
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In addition, the immensely complex legal and organisational requirements to create a qualified electronic signature caused vendors to design software and hardware in such a way to ensure the customer must always buy the same application or product in the future. For instance, it is practically impossible to install a qualified certificate on a smart card other than the one sold by a given certification authority (in Poland the qualified certification authority must be approved by the Ministerstwo Gospodarki (Ministry of Economics)), even if the smart card would satisfy such legal requirements 29 as Common Criteria certification 30 by SSCD profile at EAL4 (evaluation assurance level).
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The way Directive 1999/93/EC has been interpreted by regulation at the local level, together with the immaturity of the technology, has resulted in a situation where it is necessary to devise a separate project for each business purpose that required smart cards, which means that each employee is issued with a number of cards, each tied to different vendor. For example, if a customer has a compliant smart card from certification authority 1 (CA 1), and they go to CA 2, then CA 2 will require the customer to buy their card, rather than generate the private key on the card they already have in their possession. This can partially be explained by an attempt by the vendor to force the customer to buy a new smart card from them, and partially because of the incompatibilities described above.
Interoperability summary
All of the challenges mentioned above -lack of format compatibility, few generic and usable applications (by an 'application' is meant 'a computer program used by a user'), the requirement to install software drivers for both the reader and the card, plus additional difficulties requiring technical skills (such as those described below) -make the applications sector that produces qualified electronic signatures one of the worst in respect of ease of use. Taken together, these small annoyances that each separately looked 'easy' (engineers) or 'necessary' (lawyers) have made the QES difficult to use.
The popular explanation by technicians that security has its own special requirements has never been valid, especially when such an assertion is plainly not true. For instance, authors of one Polish application (Elektroniczna Skrzynka Podawcza by Zeto Białystok) required the user to run a special command line to change the settings of .NET security policies (this is a Microsoft programming library or framework that is used to code the program -the user should never be required to even touch this), and another one (eDeklaracje by the Ministry of Finance) instructed users to manually change extensions of Adobe AIR programs (with the same problem as previously described, but with a different vendor) just to send an electronically signed file. Neither of these technical design attributes was caused by the need for security, but rather by the immaturity of the underlying technology. On the other hand, vendors did not consider such issues as of any relevance. For instance, the administration offices in Poland were required to buy or outsource the Internet document gateway (ESP) in a relatively short time; it was formal compliance with law that was a priority, not the ease of use, even if the average citizen could not use the software. The conclusion is, that regardless of the optimistic visions of digital signatures that are presented to users, the technology will not work if the underlying technologies are not mature enough to provide stable products that can be used by lay people. Where the user has the choice of ugly, counter-intuitive but highly secure applications that only allowed them to produce a qualified electronic signature, or their popular office applications that were not considered approved for QES, the users simply voted with their feet. The failure for the QES to be taken up by users has nothing to do with lack of trust in the internet or old habits, because the same people use the internet to buy and sell (auctions, food, clothes, holidays, air travel, to name but a few) and use internet banking all the time.
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The provisions relating to the QES in Directive 1999/93/EC provide an imperfect attempt at providing for an almost totally secure method of electronic signature. But those responsible for producing the QES fail to understand that the practical issues for both people and business centre around weighting the cost and benefits of a specific technical product. The QES, which is very expensive and a burden to use, provides highly sophisticated protection against attacks that are not very relevant for most e-commerce use 34 -indeed, the QES level of security was often figuratively demonstrated by comparison with the notary services.
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The qualified electronic signature as an information services preventer
The qualified electronic signature provides a very high level of security: it offers authenticity, integrity and nonrepudiation (non-repudiation means that it can be demonstrated that software communicated with software, not that the person whose private key it was, was the person responsible for using the key) -but its history in Europe is the ultimate proof that more security is not always better. This is because of cost, which is a direct function of the amount of security. The cost includes not only the direct cost of buying a certificate, but also the costs of running an organisation and the cost of using a QES. In the case of the QES, the assumed security strength levels make all these costs relatively high.
The QES was initially intended to make cross-border business and administration contacts easier and cheaper, but this objective was lost somewhere on the way. It is not possible to make things cheaper and easier with something that is disproportionately expensive and difficult to use in comparison to the purpose for which such signatures will be put. For instance, simple informative services usually require little or even no authentication of the requesting party (for instance, checking a VAT number, a business registration number or a certificate of residence). Where a user wishes to test the authenticity and integrity of a source of data, it is usually sufficient to rely on SSL server authentication or a Web Trust signature built into a PDF file. 36 Even the submission of annual or monthly tax declarations usually require authentication at a level not exceeding what is currently used by most internet banks (password and username), and such levels have worked for years in the USA 37 and UK, 38 and now in the new Polish e-Deklaracje system that no longer requires QES since 2009, as described below.
One security function that needs to be pointed out separately is non-repudiation. This is a function that QES provides at very high level, but it is very expensive. By non-repudiation, is meant the accumulation of evidence in respect to the use of the card, and the use of behaviour modification to force users into changing their behaviour, thus making it more difficult for a user to provide a trivial excuse to deny that they were responsible for initiating a transaction.
The security surrounding the QES provides a high level of assurance that a QES was affixed to a document and sent from one computer to another computer over the internet. Although the concept of single security mechanism such as the QES is tempting to use from the point of view of the organisation and in terms of interoperability, the problems and costs associated with the QES effectively prevents the development of electronic services, instead of helping to develop them. This is because each administration has large number of processes that vary in requirements for the level of security assurance associated with the QES. Defining a single security function covering all of the processes an organisation might want, means that the security level needs to be adjusted for the most demanding process. But the 'one size fits all' approach means that excess security is not for free. In particular, the costs of security for the end user are notoriously ignored. Some Member States in the EU understood this. E-government services were begun, such as revenue service declarations, without a QES. The government gateway in the United Kingdom started around 2001 with login and password, and new security features have been subsequently introduced for users to take up if they wish to. On the other hand, a large number of trivial informative processes (such as the issuing of declarations and certificates) were effectively blocked in Poland by the strategic decision taken in 2001 that a QES was the only method that was permitted to establish trust between the citizen and the government. Buying a qualified certificate at a cost of US$100 to request or send a simple declaration made no economic sense for most citizens, but the administration was not permitted to use simpler methods, even if they were considered to be adequate for the purpose. 39 The inability to admit this simple fact resulted in the waste of public money on an unbelievable scale. By 2008, most public administration units in Poland were required to buy or outsource an Internet document gateway (ESP) 40 that only allowed communications with the use of a QES. The market for qualified certificates was such that only 0.01 per cent of the population acquired a qualified certificate, and there was little economic sense for citizens to buy any more, which meant that the administration spent millions of euros for systems that were virtually never used. An ESP gateway in Krakow (population of 750,000) reported in 2009 that around five electronically signed documents were being submitted annually since it was installed. 41 It follows that official communications still had to occur, and they continued to be transacted on paper, not because people were afraid of the internet as some claimed, 42 but because the solution created with the QES was not easy to use and expensive.
The view that it was only possible to use a qualified electronic signature was supported by some certification authorities that acted in various ways to encourage their use, and requested the government to create incentives for citizens to use a QES. These efforts were partially successful. Attempts to liberalise the use of qualified electronic signatures were effectively prevented in 2004, when they were first mentioned, until 2010 when new draft law should be enacted Where the qualified electronic signature does not work E-invoicing was introduced to reduce the cost of traditional invoicing -printing, paper, human work, postal services etc -and it makes sense only if the cost is indeed smaller. The QES was introduced to provide L15, 17.1.2002, p. 24-28. high levels of security, including non-repudiationwhich is arguably irrelevant in the case of e-invoicing.
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E-invoicing is about fast, automated generation and provision of VAT tax and deduction information. The objectives of a QES are the opposite -it is necessary to view the document, unblock the smart card, view the legal notices (which are substantial) and sign -it is not possible to make it a fast and automated process.
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The e-invoicing security model centres around the authenticity of the company of origin, and the integrity 46 of the content -and that is all that is required (as explicitly stated in Directive 2001/115/EC 47 ). The QES provides for a reasonably strong link to an individual person and technical non-repudiation. The latter aspect increases the cost and makes it unsuitable for einvoicing. This means the security requirements of einvoicing and the features provided by a QES are largely contrary to what is required.
As mentioned above, Directive 2001/115/EC requires 'authenticity and integrity' of an e-invoice, but it does not require a QES (it merely allows the use of a qualified electronic signature along with other methods). However, Polish legislation has chosen the QES-only approach, also allowing EDI. Supporters of QES-only einvoices raised three main types of arguments: the highest level security is required for customers to trust e-invoices; any other integrity protection other than QES will confuse customers, and e-invoices should promote QES (a circular argument).
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Polish statistics from 2007 49 indicated that only 5 per cent of companies were exposed to e-invoicing, and out of that, most were supermarkets using EDI, and not the QES. The QES based e-invoicing exchange between small and medium companies is still practically nonexistent, in that the 5 per cent use is based on the statistics from the Central Statistical Office -especially if compared to other countries such as Denmark, where it is over 60 per cent.
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Instead of the promised savings and increase in the take-up of electronic invoicing, a number of pathological business practices started to appear to work around the flawed legislation.
From 2009, several companies with a large end-user base, such as Telekomunikacja Polska S.A., started to issue e-invoices using a QES, because they presumably saw it as a way to reduce the costs while preserving the legal requirement to provide the invoice to consumers. But the increased value of security was questionable because of how it was implemented. Consumers received an unsigned PDF with the invoice in one file and a detached QES signature in another file. The signature could be verified only by using a special program from the vendor, which meant the users merely looked at the unsigned PDF and ignored the signature file. This is a perfect example of how the implementation of security can be perfectly legal and perfectly useless in reality. Other companies on the other hand, especially small and medium size companies, resolved the problem of the restrictive einvoice regulations by exchanging plain, unsigned PDF files by e-mail, which the recipient printed and dealt with as if they received the invoice as a paper invoice through the postal service. If they did not do this, it would not be possible to deduct the VAT -and it was virtually impossible for the tax inspector to prove that the document had not arrived by post.
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A positive example was Denmark where, from 1 February 2005, after creating a usable framework called OCES, it was made compulsory for both public entities and their suppliers to use e-invoices. 52 Since then, many countries have followed with flexible and purposeoriented e-invoicing legal frameworks (Sweden, Finland, Italy, as mentioned in the European E-Invoicing Final Report). As result, more than 60 per cent of all invoices in use were electronic ones in Denmark as of 2007, including all invoices exchanged with the public administration. 53 The same applies for Swedish administration (Svefaktura), where invoicing savings are estimated at around 365 million euro over 5 years.
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Another case where Polish regulators insisted on the 'only a QES' approach, is when they tried to describe standard requirements for the electronic governmental gateway (ESP) that issued an electronic confirmation of reception: 'Urzędowe Poświadczenie Odbioru' (UPO) literally 'official reception confirmation'. The UPO should be automatically generated by the system, timestamped and signed. 55 The problem was how to sign it. A QES cannot be used without human intervention, and all previous purpose-driven proposals to establish some less restrictive forms of signature were rejected based on the 'only a QES will be satisfactory' approach. Eventually, the regulator was forced to create a separate class of signatures, not tied to any certification tree, that are dedicated to signing the UPO.
On the other hand, an example on how giving up a qualified electronic signature has enabled electronic services, is the Polish revenue reporting service eDeklaracje. When based on QES, its use was marginal (306 declarations were sent in 2007 56 ). In 2009, for the first time, citizens could send declarations without a QES 57 -the simple sender authentication was based on the knowledge of the amount of tax paid the previous year. Even though this was only made available two weeks before the closing of the annual revenue reporting period (the end of April), over 90,000 citizens used it -this was probably by an order of magnitude more than the sum of any electronic documents sent by individuals to the administration over the past decade. In 2010, the number of tax declarations sent this way was 355,000. 58 The number of fraudulent submissions, jokes and other forms of misbehaviour predicted by the critics was zero in both years.
ZUS, an example of QES misunderstanding
ZUS, the Polish social insurance operator, introduced the digital signature in 1999, because it built a system that allowed companies to submit employee declarations electronically. It was initially based on X.509 certificates issued by an external Certification Authority on behalf of ZUS. The certificate was assigned to a company as a whole, it was software based (no smart card) and issued to companies for free. No design documents were ever published, but it seemed to work and to be close to an optimal compromise between security and usability.
In 2005, for reasons that have never been precisely explained, the government decided that ZUS would change over to using qualified electronic signatures. Obviously, the 200,000 companies that used to send their declarations to ZUS for free would have to pay for the certificate. were less than 10,000 active qualified certificates sold by Polish certification centres, most of which were bought by the public administration or organisations that were required to use QES by law in some part of their activities (for example, notaries and banks). After the conversion, which is a perfect example of a market created by the government, the rush for qualified certificates started in 2008 and reached around 200,000 certificates, where it is now. 59 Contrary to what the people that advocated the use of qualified electronic signatures predicted, this enforced 'stimulus' did not cause an increase in interest among individuals, even if the ESP gateways mentioned above already existed (neither did it cause a predicted decline in the prices of qualified certificates). The estimated cost of the conversion for the private sector -ignored by most people speaking on this subject -was between 15 and 24 million euro, with an additional cost of 10 million euro annually. The cost of the conversion for ZUS is unknown.
The decision caused an avalanche of problems, apparently never predicted by whoever made the decision. First, the QES is associated with an individual person. For business continuity purposes, companies were advised to buy not one, but several certificates to ensure the declarations can be still sent if someone is not available because they are on leave, sick or otherwise not available. Large companies had to buy several certificates, to the amusement of companies selling certificates. Small companies did the opposite. To save money, they had one certificate, and everyone knew the password, making the whole QES model look like an amusing spectacle for laughter.
Second, a QES is issued to a named individual, so there is an assumption that when the QES is used, it was the person whose QES it is, who caused the signature to be affixed to the data. Now, ZUS knew with the highest confidence assured by a QES that Jan Kowalski purportedly sent a declaration for Acme, but ZUS did not know what relation Jan Kowalski was to Acme.
60 Jan Kowalski could be the company's accountant, the external accountant or a complete stranger, and ZUS had no way of knowing this.
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When this was first raised as an opportunity for forgery, ZUS correctly explained that it does not create any reasonable risk of forgery. Shortly after that, ZUS apparently decided that this gap, however, created a risk for the internal integrity of the data, and in 2009 introduced the idea that companies start buying attribute certificates 62 to confirm the relation between a physical person and a legal entity. In the meantime, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (MSWiA) announced that ZUS could potentially use a new, non-QES technique for authentication called a 'trusted profile', 63 that should go into production by the end of 2010. If this works, the QES 'silver bullet' 64 for ZUS would make a full circle to the point where it came from -back on a very bumpy and very expensive road indeed.
